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ABSTRACT
Traffic inspection is a fundamental building block of many
security solutions today. For example, to prevent the leakage
or exfiltration of confidential insider information, as well as
to block malicious traffic from entering the network, most
enterprises today operate intrusion detection and prevention
systems that inspect traffic. However, the state-of-the-art in-
spection systems do not reflect well the interests of the dif-
ferent involved autonomous roles. For example, employees
in an enterprise, or a company outsourcing its network man-
agement to a specialized third party, may require that their
traffic remains confidential, even from the system adminis-
trator. Moreover, the rules used by the intrusion detection
system, or more generally the configuration of an online or
offline anomaly detection engine, may be provided by a third
party, e.g., a security research firm, and can hence consti-
tute a critical business asset which should be kept confiden-
tial. Today, it is often believed that accounting for these ad-
ditional requirements is impossible, as they contradict effi-
ciency and effectiveness. We in this paper explore a novel
approach, called Privacy Preserving Inspection (PRI), which
provides a solution to this problem, by preserving privacy of
traffic inspection and confidentiality of inspection rules and
configurations, and e.g., also supports the flexible installa-
tion of additional Data Leak Prevention (DLP) rules specific
to the company.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become a critical and indispensable
infrastructure for many organizations. At the same time,
the Internet constitutes a security threat. For example,
web-based services, such as email, are indispensable for
communicating with others either within or outside of an
organization, but introduce the risk of data exfiltration.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) as well as Intru-
sion Prevention Systems (IPS) are frequently used today
to defend networks (or specific servers) from cyber at-
tacks [21, 27]. In particular, such systems can prevent
exfiltration of confidential insider information by block-
ing accidental or intentional leakage, e.g., by searching
for document confidentiality watermarks in the data
transferred out of an enterprise network. Such systems
are also vital to control inbound traffic, and e.g., to
detect if packets from a compromised sender contain
an attack, employ parental filtering to prevent children
from accessing adult material, etc. [25] Indeed, many
cyber attacks today are carried out remotely, exploiting
vulnerabilities in network components or applications,
or tempting naive users to download malware and install
them on their PCs.
To provide such functionality, these systems rely on
traffic inspection: they allow the definition of configu-
ration rules which define known attack patterns, indi-
cators for attacks, or traffic anomalies, and which are
matched against the packet header and payload. If rules
are matched, alerts are generated, and/or, in case of
prevention systems or firewalls, packets are dropped.
The corresponding rules can either be distributed by
a local support team, by a third party (for instance a
security research firm), by the network operator, or a
combination thereof: third party provided rules can be
complemented with organization-specific asset leakage
indicators, coming from Data Leakage Prevention (DLP)
systems.
While today’s intrusion detection and prevention sys-
tems typically perform well for unencrypted traffic, they
struggle with encrypted traffic, resulting in false nega-
tives or poor performance. As a workaround, in practice
today, the secure and encrypted channel from or to the
Internet is often terminated at a proxy, which essen-
tially mounts some kind of “man-in-the-middle-attack”.
While this solution ensures an effective detection and
prevention, it comes at the price that the privacy of
user traffic (e.g., emails) is undermined. In fact, even in
the case where communication was already unencrypted
anyway, performing deep packet inspection (not for the
purpose of forwarding) can be seen as privacy violation.
Indeed, users and clients have criticized this approach
and expressed worry, e.g., that the private logged data
is given to marketers [25, 29, 31].
Privacy-preserving intrusion detection may not only
be desirable and relevant in the context of enterprise
networks, but is also gaining in importance in the light
of today’s trend to outsource the network management,
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including security aspects, to third parties [24]. For
example, the management of third-party networks can be
a lucrative business for Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
At the same time, for customers running security critical
businesses (for example banks), it is important that the
privacy of traffic be preserved.
We in this paper however observe another confiden-
tiality issue of today’s solutions: it concerns the con-
fidentiality of the inspection logic itself. For example,
the development and maintenance of effective intrusion
detection rules is challenging, and especially small en-
terprises do not have the expertise and time to define
the most effective rules and constantly follow the news.
This constitutes a business opportunity for third parties:
a company specialized into security research can take
over the responsibility to define and maintain a good
rule set. However, such a business model also introduces
new requirements. In particular, a third party company
may not be willing to share its rules, or more generally
configurations of (online or offline) anomaly detection
systems, with the customer: these rules and configura-
tions are an intellectual property which constitute an
essential asset of the business model.
At first sight, it may appear that the requirements
are contradicting: First, it seems unavoidable that an
intrusion detection or prevention system, which for ef-
ficiency and effectiveness reasons needs to inspect the
traffic in an unencrypted form, may leak information
about the user traffic. Second, it also seems unavoidable
that a system administrator operating a system based
on the rules of a third party company, can see the rules.
1.1 Contribution
We identify the different autonomous roles involved
in a traffic inspection system, including intrusion detec-
tion/prevention systems, but also more sophisticated
online or offline anomaly detection systems as they may
for example be required to deal with insider threats. We
then explore the feasibility of providing a system which
meets these requirements, respecting the autonomy of
the different involved stakeholders, without introducing
new threats coming, e.g., from insiders.
In particular, we present a Privacy-Preserving Intru-
sion detection/prevention system, short PRI (fruit in
Hebrew), which decouples the different roles, and hence
significantly reduces the required trust assumptions. PRI
leverages the hardware protection of architectures like
Intel SGX [30] to defend against insiders or system
administrators aiming to break the confidentiality. A
distinguishing feature of PRI is the simple and cheap
deployment: a single trusted hardware component is suf-
ficient. On the user side, only a simple software update
is required.
1.2 Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we present a model which identifies the
different roles/stakeholders and the resulting require-
ments for the traffic inspection system. After providing
the necessary background (Section 3), based on these
requirements, Section 4 describes our proposed architec-
ture PRI which meets these requirements. We discuss
use cases in Section 5 and review related work in Sec-
tion 6, and we conclude our contribution in Section 7.
2. ROLES AND REQUIREMENTS
In the following, we first present the different roles and
discuss their objectives. Based on this model, we then
derive security goals. Note that for ease of presentation,
in the following, we will mostly focus on intrusion detec-
tion. However, our approach can easily be generalized
to prevention or configuration-based systems, as we will
elaborate more later in this paper.
We in this paper distinguish between the following
roles:
• The administrators: The administrators are re-
sponsible for ensuring the availability and security
of the network. In particular, they want to prevent
the leakage of sensitive insider information, and also
prevent malicious traffic entering the network from
the outside. Besides relying on up-to-date security
rules possibly provided by an external company, ad-
ministrators may also want to be able to add their
own Data Leak Prevention (DLP) rules, specific to
their organization.
• The users: The term user will generally refer to
the communication endpoints. In particular, we
will usually assume that one endpoint is inside an
enterprise (an insider) while the other is outside (an
outsider); however, also traffic between two insiders
can be subject to inspection. We assume that while
users profit from a secure environment and the de-
tection of undesired inbound and outbound traffic,
they also desire a high communication performance
as well as confidentiality of their traffic.
• The rules (configuration) provider: The rules
for the intrusion detection system (or more gen-
erally the configurations for a traffic inspection
system based on some open-source logic/engine)
may be provided by an external security company
specialized into developing and maintaining high-
quality rules. The rules provider may desire that
its rules remain confidential.
Given our roles and their objectives, we identify the
following requirements:
R1 Efficient and effective inspection: The inspec-
tion system must ensure to the administrators that
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relevant events and attacks will be detected suc-
cessfully and fast.
R2 Privacy-preserving traffic inspection: We
want to ensure to the users that neither the network
administrator nor the rule/configuration provider
should be able to see the traffic.
R3 Confidentiality of rules: We want to ensure that
the rules are kept confidential and are not leaked
to the other roles.
This paper is motivated by the question whether it
is possible to design an architecture which meets the
different goals of the different roles, maintaining their
autonomy. Indeed, designing such a system seems chal-
lenging:
• Today’s proxy solutions do not meet the require-
ments R2 and R3: a proxy server can be exploited
by the administrators to learn about the unen-
crypted traffic. Rather, we want to develop a so-
lution which does not allow the administrators to
configure the inspection system in a way that al-
lows them to learn details about the traffic which
are not security relevant.
• Networks usually operate at very high rates: cryp-
tographic schemes based on fully homomorphic or
functional encryption [9, 11, 13] are slow and can
decrease network rates by many orders of magni-
tude [12], violating requirement R1.
At a first glance, the requirements seem to contradict:
a system may hardly be able to efficiently and effectively
inspect traffic without introducing opportunities to the
administrator to see the traffic and used rules. However,
as we will see in the following, there do exist solutions
to satisfy these seemingly conflicting properties.
3. BACKGROUND
Before presenting our solution, we provide some back-
ground which is necessary to undertand our solution. In
particular, we revisit IDS systems and give an introduc-
tion to SGX.
3.1 Traffic Inspection Systems
Almost all cyber security breaches involve transmis-
sions of traffic over a network. The standard approach
to secure transmissions is to inspect traffic, checking
whether the traffic carries the attack (e.g., a malware)
or its outcome (e.g., a stolen digital asset). For this
purpose, organizations deploy packet inspection systems
in their networks, configuring them with known attack
indicators, in the case of Intrusion Detection/Prevention
Systems (IDS/IPS), and with (possibly organization-
specific) asset leakage indicators in the case of Data
Leakage Prevention (DLP) systems.
All inspection systems essentially search for the con-
figured indicators inside the traffic, where indicators can
be based on exact match strings, regular expressions,
statistical properties, and more. Inspection of traffic
in these systems usually includes the inspection of the
packet payload, i.e., accessing the application layer data.
A simpler type of inspection that considers only the
packet headers (up to the transport layer) is often per-
formed by firewalls. A firewall is a network security
system that monitors and controls the incoming and
outgoing network traffic and may also include IDS/IPS
capabilities. Firewalls can be considered as a barrier
between a trusted, secure internal network and another
outside network, such as the Internet, thereby mitigating
attacks in the early stage of penetration. Firewalls can
also be host based, operating on and defending a single
machine.
Inspection systems are also used to detect insider
threats [7], for example by analyzing confidential doc-
uments in private communications, possibly enhanced
with watermarking techniques [26].
Web security today is usually realized with HTTPS,
which relies on the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
a.k.a. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. TLS/SSL
provides confidentiality, integrity and authentication of
data in transit. The protocol offers encryption, hash
functions or message digests, and digital signatures.
Encrypted traffic constitutes a great challenge to
packet inspection systems as it hides the payload con-
tent from anyone but the session endpoints. There are
two common solutions to this challenge. The first is to
extend host based firewalls to gain access to the data be-
fore being encrypted : this can be implemented through
integration with the host operating system. We will
refer to this solution as the client-side firewall approach.
The second solution, usually deployed by large firms, is
to operate a middlebox that serves as a proxy between
any internal user PC and any external web server. The
implementation of such a solution requires to config-
ure (trick) the user PCs to identify the proxy as the
server and establish an encrypted session with it rather
than with the server.
However, both the distributed firewall as well as the
proxy architecture expose the user data to 3rd parties,
namely the firewall producer, the proxy vendor or the
network operator, possibly violating the user privacy.
In addition, the inspection rules, which are the intellec-
tual property of security researchers or firms, might be
extracted at the host or the proxy, undermining their
effectiveness and profit.
3.2 SGX
Intel Software Guard Extensions (Intel SGX) [8, 15,
17, 30] are new CPU instructions which allow applica-
tions to manage private regions of code and data. That
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Figure 1: Setup of the PRI system compo-
nents. The PRI process is configured to inspect
user traffic according to security rules inserted
by the policy issuer. The process is secured and
ensures confidentiality of traffic and rules. Keys
and rules are stored safely in the PRI storage.
is, using SGX, an application can run in a protected
environment, the so-called enclave, secure from malware
or the inspection by the computer administrators.
There is no need to encrypt the protected portion of
an application for distribution. Before the enclave is
built, the enclave code and data is free for inspection and
analysis. When the protected portion is loaded into an
enclave, its code and data is measured. An application
can prove its identity to a remote party (a procedure
called attestation) and be securely provisioned with keys
and credentials. The application can also request an
enclave and platform specific key that it can use to
protect keys and data that it wishes to store outside
the enclave. In addition to the security properties, the
enclave environment offers scalability and performance
associated with the execution on the main CPU of a
platform.
4. PRIVACY PRESERVING INSPECTION
This section shows that the design goals and require-
ments derived above can actually be met, assuming the
availability of a trusted hardware. In particular, this
section presents our Privacy Preserving Inspection ar-
chitecture, short PRI. PRI allows the inspection, and if
considered harmful, possibly prevention, of encrypted
traffic while guaranteeing that no information about the
traffic is leaked from the inspecting device, and that
inspection rules are not revealed to the operator of the
device nor the traffic generator.
In a nutshell, the idea underlying PRI is to decouple
and separate the different roles (e.g., users, administra-
tors, security company) by defining an interface between
them and supporting verification. In order to achieve
this deoupling, PRI relies on a single device (such as
Intel SGX or ARM TEE) which decrypts traffic from
the users, applies the desired security rules, and when
needed raises alerts or drops the traffic, without leak-
ing information about the user traffic nor the applied
rules, to the roles which are not allowed to have this
information. Interestingly, a single trusted box is suffi-
cient for PRI: no hardware modifications are required
on the user side. Moreover, an important aspect of
PRI is that the user side agent and the enclaved system
can be open-source: thus, the users and the research
community can and should verify its privacy preserving
property. The attestation allows the agent to verify that
it communicating with the verified system code.
4.1 Setting Up PRI
Let us first discuss the setup of PRI (cf Figure 1). We
describe it for the enterprise intrusion detection scenario,
but it is easy to adapt it to ISP outsourcing scenarios.
The PRI system consists of the user’s communication
device, e.g., a personal computer (PC) (or smartphone,
laptop, etc.) and the PRI server which need to be set
up as follows. On the user side, we simply need to
install a PRI agent at the encryption layer of the OS
or specific application (e.g., web browser). The PRI
agent is configured with a user key, kU , which is securely
transmitted (through attestation) to the enclaved PRI
system. In addition the agent is installed in a way that
allow it to gain the key, kS , of every encrypted session
S, that uses the encryption layer enabling it to securely
send it to the PRI system.
The setup also involves configuring the PRI server with
the rules (also called the policy) that need to be checked
against the traffic. Rules can be configured by multiple
policy issuers, each of them can connect securely to the
PRI process, validating its secure execution (attestation)
and sending the rules. As a result, the PRI process
stores the rules in the secured storage, to be used when
a user traffic needs to be inspected.
4.2 Operating PRI
Once the system has been set up, the registered users’
traffic can be inspected. Inspection is carried in the
following steps, see also Figure 2.:
1. An encrypted session is established between the
applications of the user PC and an external (un-
registered) or internal PC.
2. The user PC connects to the PRI process (at the
PRI server), and sends to it the session key en-
cripted by the shared user key, i.e., [kS ]kU .
3. The session traffic is duplicated and processed by
the PRI process.
4. The session traffic is decrypted, using the session
key.
5. The session data (clear text) is inspected with the
rules configured in the system.
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Figure 2: The PRI system inpects user session
using the key sent by the agent. Matches are
saved in a secured storage and alerts are sent to
the corporate SIM server about detected anoma-
lies.
6. In case part of the data matches a rule, this part is
securely stored in the PRI storage and an alert (con-
taining the rule identifier) is reported the corporate
Security Information Management (SIM) server.
Note that in case of misconfiguration, or malicious
activity in the user PC that results in decryption failure
at the PRI system, a special alert is reported.
There exists another more subtle threat for the con-
fidentiality of the traffic: even if the traffic cannot be
inspected, the reported matches over traffic leak infor-
mation. In order to prevent an attacker from abusing
the security rules to learn about private user data (e.g.,
matching every possible byte or word), the PRI system
allows each user to request the parts of his or her traf-
fic which have been matched by the inspecting device,
and thus to learn about and detect the use of abnormal
matching rules. To ensure this, our system uses a special
viewer application which connects to the PRI process,
authenticates as the user and issues the request. As
a result, the PRI process retrieves the user’s matches
from the secured storage and sends them to the viewer
app (cf Figure 3.).
In addition, the PRI system can securely inspect
static (e.g., likelihood of match for common words)
and dynamic (e.g., average number of hits per traffic
byte) properties of the rules, thereby detecting abnormal
rule sets. Also note that inferring traffic content from
matches is practically difficult in the prevention opera-
tion mode of the PRI system, since the user session is
automatically dropped as a response to the first match.
The PRI system not only supports intrusion detec-
tion but also intrusion prevention, see Figure 4: The
main difference from detection, is that for prevention,
the outcome of the inspection determines whether the
session traffic is forwarded through the PRI system, or
dropped (in case of a match).
Figure 3: The PRI system includes a special
viewer app which allows users to verify that
matching rules are not abused to violate confi-
dentiality of their traffic.
4.3 A Note on Implementation
We started experimenting with an emulated software
version of the SGX framework. However, as the market
introduction of the actual secure hardware is delayed,
our prototype is simple and still contains untrusted
parts. Nevertheless, in the following, we report on some
preliminary insights.
On the user side, we need to extract encrypted session
keys and securely transfer them to the PRI server. This
can be performed in multiple ways. For example, at the
application level, applications can report their session
keys (as browsers support [30]) and a PRI agent then
sends them to the PRI server. Alternatively, applications
can be extended (e.g., using a browser plugin) to directly
send their key to the PRI server. A third approach is
to modify encryption services offered by the operating
system, to send the used keys to the PRI server.
On the server side, an inspection program needs to be
executed in an enclaved environment, using the reported
user session keys. We argue that adjusting existing IDS
systems to our needs requires minor code modifications:
the computations can be performed in user mode and the
memory consumption can be optimized, which should
make it easy to enclave them. Today there exist several
good open-source IDSs such as Snort [27], Bro [21] and
Suricata [28], which we suggest to employ.
Given a selected existing open-source IDS system, we
propose the following high level design concepts for the
PRI server application: (1) The decryption of traffic can
be handled by a new enclaved module that pushes the
plain text outcome to the enclaved and modified IDS
system. (2) The enclaved IDS system is reduced to only
handle protocols that are known to be encrypted (e.g.,
HTML), or to inspect rules that need to be hidden,
thereby reducing the memory footprint which is limited
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Use Case
Enterprise Security and Insiders Outsourced Security Anti-Terror Intelligence
Entities
Clients employees enterprise civilians / web hosts
PRI Operators admins external ISPs
Rule Providers admins + external external governments
Table 1: Comparison of PRI use cases.
Figure 4: The PRI system can also be used for
prevention, not only detection. In this case, de-
pending on the result of the inspection, it is de-
cided whether traffic can be forwarded or should
be dropped.
in the enclaved environment. (3) In parallel to the
enclaved IDS, a standard (not enclaved) IDS is operated
for non-encrypted traffic and with open-source rules,
utilizing the standard less restricted environment.
In our prototype, we attend to the problem of hu-
man based data leakage, and focus on the decryption of
common webmail services. We noticed that this traffic
is mainly composed of (encrypted) HTTP/2 [4] traf-
fic which uses HPACK compression. This protocol is
not supported by the IDSs we examined, and therefore
requires special adapters.
In general, the code of both the client and server
side of the PRI system should be fully open, allowing
the research community to examine them and verify
their privacy preservation properties. Combining the
verification of the code with the attestation of the server
by the client constitutes the basis of the system trust.
5. USE CASES
We believe that the ideas underlying PRI can be
interesting in several contexts and beyond the standard
enterprise network security scenario we discussed in
this paper so far. In the following, three examples are
discussed in more detail. A comparison is given in
Table 1.
5.1 Enterprise Security and Insider Threats
Email and cloud services (e.g., Google Docs, storage,
etc.) are indispensable but introduce a risk for many
organizations today. In particular, such services can be
used by a malicious insider to steal intellectual prop-
erty or sensitive company information. Indeed, insider
attacks pose some unique challenges for security admin-
istrators. In general, it can be challenging to configure
an intrusion detection system and define a good rule set
to detect internal attacks: different users should have
access to and use many different services, servers, and
systems for their work. However, over the last years,
several interesting IDS-based solutions have been de-
veloped to detect insider threats [7], e.g., searching for
confidential documents and watermarks in private com-
munications [26]. Our approach is directly applicable to
these systems.
Even in scenarios where IDS-based systems may be
insufficient, PRI can be attractive: PRI is also applicable
in more general security solutions, for example systems
which are based on machine learning or anomaly detec-
tion of online or offline traffic data, and which can consist
of an open-source engine and a possibly confidential con-
figuration. More concretely, advanced methods to detect
insider attacks usually consider a wider context when
processing network events, therefore requiring to store
and query the entire event history [16], and include ma-
chine learning algorithms [5] (e.g., anomaly detection).
Our design can be extended to support these methods,
by utilizing the secure storage to save the events history
and to execute the advanced inspection as an enclaved
process that analyzes the history instead of the current
traffic. In these cases, our extended system also allows
to split the open source inspection engine from the in-
spection rules, e.g., the big data queries or the machine
learning parameters and filters, while supporting very
general notions of privacy [18, 19, 20].
5.2 Network Outsourcing
Another use case arises in the context of network out-
sourcing: We currently witness the trend that enterprises
wish to outsource their cyber security logic or even the
entire network administration to an external company
experienced in this field. Translating this scenario to
our framework, the enterprise (or any of its employ-
ees and their PCs) constitutes the client, executing the
PRI agent, and the external company operates the PRI
server, executing the enclaved (and open-source) PRI
software.
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5.3 Anti-Terror Intelligence
An interesting use case also arises in the context of
governments gathering intelligence from their own cit-
izens in order to fight terror. This use case is highly
controversial today and subject to major ongoing de-
bates [1] , due to the tradeoff of preserving civil liberties
(i.e., the right for privacy) and the government duty
to save lives. With the PRI system, governments and
citizens can decide and control the level of inspection
and privacy infringement applied to the private data.
The anti-terror intelligence use case may require some
adaptations to the model. For example, the PRI system
can be operated by the ISPs that (as part of the PRI
software) can correlate the traffic with client informa-
tion. The rules are securely provided by the government,
but some aggregated information on them can be made
accessible to the public, or its representatives. The exact
matches of user traffic, cannot be provided immediately
to the user as this might prevent the authorities to ef-
fectively react to threats, therefore the PRI system may
make use of a notification delay which is defined a priori.
6. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
In an age where more and more resources and services
are outsourced, there is an increasing need for solutions
preserving critical security aspects. Over the last years,
this problem has been discussed particularly intensively
in the context of cloud computing: Although users of
cloud computing infrastructure may expect their data
to remain confidential, today’s clouds are built using a
classical hierarchical security model that aims only to
protect the privileged code (of the cloud provider) from
untrusted code (the user’s virtual machine), and does
nothing to protect user data from access by privileged
code [3]. While for many large-scale computations today,
the use of cloud computing resources is unavoidable or
at least financially very attractive, users may not be
willing to trust their cloud provider to keep their data
confidential. In fact, the cloud user must trust not only
the hardware on which her or his data is actually ana-
lyzed, but in addition also (i) the provider’s software,
including privileged software such as a hypervisor and
firmware but also the provider’s full stack of manage-
ment software; (ii) the provider’s staff, including system
administrators but also those with physical access to
hardware such as cleaners and security guards; (iii) the
law enforcement bodies in any jurisdiction where their
data may be replicated, as the Snowden leaks have re-
vealed [3, 10].
Recently, researchers have started investigating
whether similar approaches as proposed for cloud com-
puting may also be applicable in the context of computer
networks, which come with rather different requirements.
Existing systems are based on proxies and are vulnerable
to a man-in-the-middle attack on SSL, installing fake
certificates at the middlebox [14, 23]. The middlebox
can break the security of SSL and decrypt the traffic
so it can perform the Deep-Packet Inspection (DPI).
The removal of the SSL end-to-end security, results in
a host of issues. Some proposals allow users to tunnel
their traffic to a third party middlebox provider [22,
24]. But these approaches allow the middlebox owner
to inspect/read all traffic. An alternative today are dis-
tributed firewalls, a client-side approach to implement
intrusion detection/prevention.
A very interesting approach is taken by BlindBox [25]:
unlike PRI, BlindBox performs the deep-packet inspec-
tion directly on the encrypted traffic. In a nutshell, in
BlindBox, the endpoint generates a tokenized version
of the traffic which can be inspected in privacy preserv-
ing manner at a special server. This tokenized traffic
is sent in parallel to the origin, increasing the load in
the network. However, BlindBox requires the user to
compute hashes of traffic segments and to send them to
the inspection box, thereby introducing computational
overhead to the user PC, as well as traffic overhead to
the network. Moreover it is dependent on the coopera-
tion of the user PC to perform its part of the scheme.
In addition, BlindBox only supports exact match rules
and not regular expressions, that are commonly used in
security policies.
We believe that our approach nicely complements
these works, and focuses on a relevant use case, namely
traffic inspection. An SGX approach as recently sug-
gested in the context of cloud computing, could be used
to implement our secure server, and the decoupling of
the various roles identified in our paper.
Table 2 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages
of the different architectures: the man-in-the-middle
proxy and the client-side distributed firewalls used to-
day, as well as BlindBox and PRI. Among these solutions,
only BlindBox and PRI are providing the required pri-
vacy guarantees. The main limitation of BlindBox is
arguably its expressive power, while the main limitation
of PRI is its dependency on a SGX hardware (although
a single box is sufficient).
7. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the classic problem of traffic in-
spection from an interesting new, privacy preserving
perspective. In particular, while today it is commonly
believed that it is inevitable that users have to blindly
trust the administrator managing the intrusion detection
or prevention system, we in this paper, have questioned
this assumption. In particular, we have shown that it
actually is possible to reduce trust assumptions in the
enterprise network, and presented an intrusion detection
system which is not only privacy preserving regarding
the user traffic but also regarding the rules used in the
IDS/IPS. Interestingly, the proposed PRI system re-
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Architecture
Proxy Client-Side Firewall BlindBox [25] PRI
Privacy
user exposure middlebox no no no (enclaved)
rules exposure middlebox endpoint middlebox no (enclaved)
Effectiveness
inspection guarantee yes no no yes
supports rules any any exact match only any
Overhead
computation en-&decryption none tokenization & encryption decryption
communication none none a stream of tokens one packet
Table 2: Comparison of performance and security of different IDS architectures.
quires a single secured server; no modifications of the
hardware at the users is required.
In summary, the PRI system features the following
properties:
1. It decrypts and inspects network traffic in a privacy
preserving manner.
2. It accepts new security rules from administrators
and applies them to the traffic in a secure and
privacy-preserving manner: the inspecting device
does not leak any unnecessary information about
the user traffic.
3. It can be configured with new rules from rule
providers in a secure and privacy-preserving man-
ner: the inspecting device does not leak any unnec-
essary information about the user traffic.
We believe that the ideas underlying PRI can be used
in several contexts and beyond the use cases discussed in
this paper. In particular, it is not limited to rule-based
intrusion detection systems, but can also be useful in
the context of more sophisticated and offline systems, as
they may for example be required to handle advanced
insider threats [2, 6, 7].
Our approach raises several interesting questions for
future research. Obviously, the performance of our ar-
chitecture needs to be evaluated in detail. Moreover, it
will be interesting to explore further the applications of
trusted execution environments in the context of com-
puter networking and network function virtualization.
8. REFERENCES
[1] H. Abelson, R. Anderson, S. M. Bellovin,
J. Benaloh, M. Blaze, W. W. Diffie, J. Gilmore,
M. Green, S. Landau, P. G. Neumann, R. L.
Rivest, J. I. Schiller, B. Schneier, M. A. Specter,
and D. J. Weitzner. Keys under doormats.
Commun. ACM, 58(10):24–26, Sept. 2015.
[2] R. Barrios. A multi-leveled approach to intrusion
detection and the insider threat. Scientific
Research Publishing, 2013.
[3] A. Baumann, M. Peinado, and G. Hunt. Shielding
applications from an untrusted cloud with haven.
ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 33(3), Aug. 2015.
[4] M. Belshe, R. Peon, and M. Thomson. Hypertext
transfer protocol version 2 (http/2). RFC 7540,
RFC Editor, May 2015.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7540.txt.
[5] O. Brdiczka, J. Liu, B. Price, J. Shen, A. Patil,
R. Chow, E. Bart, and N. Ducheneaut. Proactive
insider threat detection through graph learning
and psychological context. In Security and Privacy
Workshops (SPW), 2012 IEEE Symposium on,
pages 142–149, May 2012.
[6] D. Cappelli, A. Moore, R. Trzeciak, and
T. Shimeall. Common sense guide to prevention
and detection of insider threat. CERT Insider
Threat Study Team, Carnegie Mellon University,
2008.
[7] N. Einwechter. Preventing and detecting insider
attacks using ids. SecurityFocus, March, 2002.
[8] F. McKeen. Innovative instructions and software
model for isolated execution. In Proc. HASP, 2013.
[9] S. Garg, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, M. Raykova,
A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Candidate
indistinguishability obfuscation and functional
encryption for all circuits. In Proc. IEEE 54th
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science (FOCS), pages 40–49, 2013.
[10] B. Gellman and A. Soltani. Nsa infiltrates links to
yahoo, google data centers worldwide, snowden
documents say. In The Washington Post, 2013.
[11] C. Gentry. Fully homomorphic encryption using
ideal lattices. In Proc. 41st Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC),
pages 169–178, 2009.
[12] C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and N. P. Smart.
Homomorphic evaluation of the AES circuit. In
Proc. 32nd Annual Cryptology Conference
Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), pages
850–867, 2012.
[13] S. Goldwasser, Y. Kalai, R. A. Popa,
V. Vaikuntanathan, and N. Zeldovich. Reusable
garbled circuits and succinct functional encryption.
In Proc. 45th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory
of Computing (STOC), pages 555–564, 2013.
[14] L. S. Huang, A. Rice, E. Ellingsen, and C. Jackson.
Analyzing forged ssl certificates in the wild. In
Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
8
(SP), pages 83–97, 2014.
[15] I. Anati et al. Innovative technology for cpu based
attestation and sealing. In Proc. HASP, 2013.
[16] S. Inc. Detecting insider threats: How splunk
software is used to safeguard financial data, 2014.
[17] M. Hoekstra et al. Using innovative instructions to
create trustworthy software solutions. In Proc.
HASP, 2013.
[18] A. Machanavajjhala, D. Kifer, J. Gehrke, and
M. Venkitasubramaniam. L-diversity: Privacy
beyond k-anonymity. ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov.
Data, 1(1), Mar. 2007.
[19] F. D. McSherry. Privacy integrated queries: An
extensible platform for privacy-preserving data
analysis. In Proc. ACM SIGMOD International
Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD),
pages 19–30, 2009.
[20] A. Meyerson and R. Williams. On the complexity
of optimal k-anonymity. In Proc. 23rd ACM
SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on
Principles of Database Systems (PODS), pages
223–228, 2004.
[21] V. Paxson. Bro: A system for detecting network
intruders in real-time. Comput. Netw., 31(23-24),
Dec. 1999.
[22] A. Rao, J. Sherry, A. Legout, A. Krishnamurthy,
W. Dabbous, and D. Choffnes. Meddle:
Middleboxes for increased transparency and
control of mobile traffic. In Proc. ACM CoNEXT,
pages 65–66, 2012.
[23] Runa. Security vulnerability found in cyberoam dpi
devices (cve-2012-3372). In Tor Project Blog, 2012.
[24] J. Sherry, S. Hasan, C. Scott, A. Krishnamurthy,
S. Ratnasamy, and V. Sekar. Making middleboxes
someone else’s problem: Network processing as a
cloud service. In Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, pages
13–24, 2012.
[25] J. Sherry, C. Lan, R. A. Popa, and S. Ratnasamy.
Blindbox: Deep packet inspection over encrypted
traffic. In Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, pages 213–226,
2015.
[26] G. Silowash, T. Lewellen, J. Burns, and D. Costa.
Detecting and preventing data exfiltration through
encrypted web sessions via traffic inspection.
Technical Report CMU/SEI-2013-TN-012,
Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, PA, 2013.
[27] Snort. website. https: // www. snort. org/ , 2016.
[28] Suricata. website. http: // suricata-ids. org/ ,
2016.
[29] N. Vallina-Rodriguez, S. Sundaresan, C. Kreibich,
N. Weaver, and V. Paxson. Beyond the radio:
Illuminating the higher layers of mobile networks.
In Proc. ACM MobiSys, pages 375–387, 2015.
[30] S. Website. https:
//www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/
authentication/ssl-tls-whats-hood-34297.
2016.
[31] K. Zetter. The feds cut a deal with in-flight wi-fi
providers, and privacy groups are worried. In
Wired Magazine, 2014.
9
